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The appellants, pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellant Procedure, submit this Reply Brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Reply Brief, the appellants will not simply restate 
information contained in their initial Appellants1 Brief. The 
purpose of this Reply Brief is to address or clarify issues raised 
by the appellees in their Brief. If issues addressed in the 
Appellees' Brief are not directly addressed in this Reply Brief, 
the appellants intend to rely on the arguments raised on those 
issues in the initial Appellants1 Brief. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The interpretation of the following statutory provisions is 
determinative of certain issues on appeal. Other issues are 
governed by case law authority. The language of all of these 
designated statutes, except Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44, is set out in 
the Addendum of the initial Appellants' Brief. The language of 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44 is set out in the Addendum to this Reply 
Brief pursuant to Rule 24(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
1. Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
2. Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 (1989); 
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2); 
4. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2; and 
5. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Replying to Point I and Point II of Appellees1 Brief) 
THE TRAVEL COMPANY CLAIMS ARE NOT 
BARRED BY THE UTAH CORPORATE 
DISSOLUTION STATUTE 
A point of clarification is necessary. There are two sets of 
claims being asserted in this case. First are the corporate claims 
of the Travel Company. Second are the individual claims of William 
Hatton. Both sets of claims are based on the same operative facts 
and seek the same recovery. The defendants argue that the Travel 
Company claims are barred by the two year corporate dissolution 
statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100. The defendants essentially 
deny that William Hatton has an individual claim to pursue and that 
any claim of Hatton is derivative only as a shareholder of the 
Travel Company. As such, the defendants argue that Hattonfs claims 
are also barred by Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100. 
The plaintiffs counter that the Travel Company's claims are 
timely brought under the six-year statute of limitation of Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-23(2). In the alternative, the plaintiffs argue 
that the two-year corporate survival statute is not absolute and 
may be extended under certain circumstances, which circumstances 
should apply in this case. Finally, regarding the corporate 
dissolution statute, the plaintiffs argue that that statute does 
not apply to postdissolution claims such as these. 
2 
The issues regarding the corporate dissolution statute are 
discussed by the defendants in Points I, II, III, and IV of the 
Appellees* Brief. All other issues go to William Hatton's ability 
to pursue this claim individually. The plaintiffs argue that 
Hatton's individual claims are not governed by the corporate 
dissolution statute. The defendants address Hatton's individual 
claims in Point V and VI of their Brief. Now to the issues. 
Replying to Point I and Point II of the Appellees' Brief, the 
plaintiffs restate that the six-year limitation for claims on 
written contracts under Utah Code Ann. 78-12-23(2) is the 
appropriate limitations period. The defendants do not challenge 
the plaintiffs' claim that if two statutes of limitations apply to 
a claim, the longer statute is preferred. Juab County Department 
of Public Welfare v. Summers, 19 Utah 2.d 49, 146 P.2d 1 (1976); 
Woodward v. Chirco Construction, Inc., 141 Ariz. 520, 687 P.2d 1275 
(1984). The defendants simply argue that a survival statute is 
different from a statute of limitations and, therefore, cases 
construing different statutes of limitations are not applicable. 
The plaintiffs submit this as a distinction without a 
difference. The practical effect of a statute of limitations and 
a survival statute is to set a specified period of time after which 
claims may no longer be brought. The legal effect of the running 
of that limitation period is the same whether it is a statute of 
limitations or a survival statute: The plaintiff loses. The 
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plaintiffs acknowledge that their research revealed no cases which 
specifically addressed the issue of a statute of limitations verses 
a survival statute in a situation factually similar to this case. 
On the other hand, the defendants have not submitted a case 
specifically concluding that where a claim may be governed by a 
corporate survival statute and a longer statute of limitations, the 
shorter survival statute period automatically applies. 
The plaintiff submits that the policy reasons for preferring 
the longer statute are present whether the limitation period is 
technically designated a statute of limitations or a survival 
statute. That policy is stated in Safeco Insurance Co. v. 
Honeywell, Inc., 639 P.2d 996 (Alaska 1981): 
Statutes prescribing a relatively short period of time 
for allowing actions are usually construed narrowly to 
the extent necessary to give the holder of the cause of 
action a fair opportunity to present his claim. Where 
two constructions as to the limitations are possible, the 
courts prefer the one which gives the longer period in 
which to prosecute the action. 
Id. at 1001. 
POINT II 
(Replying to Appellees' Point III) 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
DICTATE THAT THE TWO-YEAR CORPORATE 
DISSOLUTION LIMITATION, IF 
APPLICABLE, BE EXTENDED 
The plaintiffs have cited cases supporting the proposition 
that under certain circumstances, the two-year limitation on 
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corporate survival may be "extended". Moore v. Nicks Fine Foods, 
Inc. , 121 111. App. 2d 923, 460 N.E.2d (1984). The "equitable 
tolling" discussed by the defendants does not represent the only 
circumstances under which the limitation period may be extended. 
Cases cited by the plaintiffs in their initial Brief allow 
corporate claims to be filed after the corporate dissolution period 
if the claims deal with "the prosecution of an action which is 
directly related to the process of winding corporate affairs." 
Striker v. Chester, 217 A.2d 31 (Del. 1966). 
The Striker court discussed those allowable actions as actions 
where "no attempt is being made to continue the corporate business 
or to institute a new cause of action", but rather to recover money 
or other property belonging to the corporation. Under those 
circumstances, the Striker court concludes that "the trustees are 
not bound by the three-year statutory period of the Michigan law 
[corporate dissolution statute] and may prosecute the pending 
action. . . . " id. at 36. Contrary to what the defendants state, 
the Striker court did cite cases where the actions where initiated 
after the corporate dissolution period had passed. For example, in 
John J. Gamalski Hardware v. Baird, 298 Mich. 662, 299 N.W. 757, 
there was a claim for replevin instituted for the repossession of 
corporate property, "such claim having been filed more than three 
5 
years after the corporation's charter had been forfeited." In that 
case, the court did not apply the three-year corporate dissolution 
statute to defeat the plaintiff's claim. 
The facts in this case are similar. The plaintiff's seek to 
recover under the terms of the Purchase Agreement and Promissory 
Note. There is no attempt to somehow continue the Travel Company 
business. This action is in the nature of winding up of the 
corporate affairs and does not violate the purposes behind the 
corporate dissolution statute. 
In addition to allowing actions in the nature of winding up 
corporate affairs, the plaintiffs argue that the statute may be 
tolled on equitable principles. The plaintiffs will not restate 
here the equitable principles listed in their initial Brief. In 
response to Point III of the Appellees' Brief, however, the 
plaintiffs submit that none of the cases cited by the defendants 
specifically concludes that all equitable considerations are barred 
in considering whether the corporate dissolution statute may be 
tolled. Each case is specifically limited to its own facts. Koepke 
v. First National Bank, 284 N.E.2d. 761 (111. Ct. App. 1972), 
simply held that the corporate dissolution statute does apply to 
claims brought in equity. That case did not specifically address 
whether, under appropriate circumstances, that limitation period 
may be equitably tolled. Similarly, in the two Canadian Ace 
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Brewing cases cited by the defendants simply stand for the 
proposition that, in those case, certain specific equitable reasons 
for tolling a statute, ie. equitable estoppel and fraudulent 
concealment, were not applied in those cases to toll the corporate 
dissolution statute. 
POINT III 
(Replying to Appellees' Point IV) 
THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE 
POSTDISSOLUTION CAUSES OF ACTION, 
NOT SUBJECT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §16-
10-100 
The plaintiff acknowledges that the distinction between a 
predissolution cause of action and a postdissolution cause of 
action, as it relates to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100, was not 
addressed in the trial court. This Court's opinion in Hansen v. 
Department of Financial Institutions, 858 P.2d 184 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) addressing that issue, was not filed until July 20, 1993, 
over a month after the trial court's Order and Final Judgment in 
this case. Hansen states that "Section 16-10-100 of the Utah Code 
places a two year limitation on the time in which a dissolved 
corporation can bring a suit for a predissolution cause of action." 
Id. at 105. (Emphasis added). 
The defendants spend a lot of time in Point IV of their Brief 
discussing representations made in the Hatton Divorce Agreement 
attested to on February 9, 1987. The defendants seem to argue that 
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because there were some rumblings about potential litigation back 
in February of 1987, before the corporate dissolution of October 1, 
1987, any claims of the plaintiffs are predissolution claims. 
That's not true. The important question is "when did the 
plaintiffs1 causes of action legally accrue?" That is the 
important inquiry both in determining whether a cause of action is 
predissolution or postdissolution and in determining when any 
applicable statute of limitations begins to run out. 
It is undisputed that payments under the Promissory Note and 
payments under the Earn Out Provisions of paragraph 3 of the 
Purchase Agreement were to be made in installments running through 
April 30, 1990. (R. 180-82). The $240,704.38 principle balance on 
the Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement listed in the 
plaintiffs1 Complaint was calculated on installment payouts through 
April 30, 1990. That conclusion is supported by the "Disputed 
Installments" definition in Appendix 4 of the Appellees' Brief. 
Those installments are defined as: 
Installments due under the Morris Note which Morris 
disputes, said installments falling due beginning on 
January 21, 1988, and continuing through April 30, 1990, 
in the total approximate principle amount of $241,000. 
It is undisputed that the Earn Out Provision of the Purchase 
Agreement entitles the plaintiffs to 30% of the amount by which the 
Travel Company revenues during any years exceeding the sum of 
$700,000. That earn out provision is to extend "during each of the 
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first five years following the Closing through April 30, 1990." 
(R. 180-82). Accounting is to be undertaken within thirty days at 
the end of each quarter of each year to determine the amounts of 
such Earn Out Payments. (R. 180-82). 
If a money obligation is payable in installments, a separate 
cause of action arises on each installment and the statute of 
limitations begins to run on each installment only when that 
installment becomes due. Application of Church, 833 P.2d 813 
(Colo. App. 1992); Clayton v. Gardner, 107 Nev. 468, 813 P.2d 997 
(1991). The Arizona Court of Appeals has taken that installment 
analysis even further, concluding that a cause of action on a 
promissory note payable in installments accrues and the statute of 
limitations commences running on the date the final installment is 
due under the note. Cheatham v. Sahuaro Collection Service, Inc., 
11 Ariz. Ct. App. 452, 577 P.2d 738 (1978). 
Utah statute provides additional evidence as to when the 
plaintiffs' causes of action accrue and the statute of limitations 
begins running in this case. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44 provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the 
principle or interests shall have been paid, or an 
acknowledgement of an existing liability, debt or claim, 
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an 
action may be brought within the period prescribed for 
the same after such payment, acknowledge, or promise. . 
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This Court recently construed that statute and concluded that 
it extends the six-year statute of limitations if: 1) P a r t i a l 
payment of either principle of interest due under the contract is 
made; 2) the payment is made by the debtor/obligor under the 
contract; and 3) the payment was made to the creditor under the 
contract. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
It is undisputed that all three elements apply in this case. 
Applying those cases and the Utah statute to the facts of this 
case, it is undisputed that: 
1. The Travel Company was involuntarily dissolved on October 
1, 1987. (R. 74). 
2. In February of 1988, the defendants made partial payment 
to the plaintiffs of $84,295.62 in principle and $8,196.95 in 
interest under the terms of the Promissory Note and Purchase 
Agreement. (R. 111-112). 
3. This action was filed on February 18, 1993. (R. 2-56). 
Under the case law cited above, the filing of this complaint 
preserved a claim for all installment payments accruing during the 
six years before the filing of the complaint. That would include 
any installment payment due or payable after February 18, 1987. 
Under the Cheatham case from Arizona, the plaintiffs' cause of 
action on the Promissory Note did not accrue until April 30, 1990, 
when the last payment was due. Therefore, all claims are preserved 
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and all claims are postdissolution causes of action. Under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-44, a new six year statute of limitations started 
running after the defendants made their February 1988 payment. 
That created a new six year cause of action in favor of the 
plaintiffs which accrued on the date of the payment, five months 
post-corporate dissolution. 
Finally, even if the corporate dissolution statute eliminates 
predissolution claims, it is clear that only affects causes of 
action which accrued before October 1, 1987. Based on the case law 
and statutes just cited, the plaintiffs have significant 
postdissolution claims which accrued after October 1, 1987 under 
the installment payment, Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement. 
The plaintiffs acknowledge that their research has not 
revealed cases which specifically address the application of the 
corporate dissolution statute to predissolution claims as opposed 
to postdissolution claims. This Court's opinion in Hansen v. 
Department of Financial Institutions, 858 P.2d 184 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) suggests that there is a distinction between predissolution 
and postdissolution claims and how such claims are affected by the 
two-year dissolution statute. These issues are submitted for 
clarification in this appeal. 
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POINT IV 
(Replying to Appellees* Point V) 
HATTON HAS AN INDEPENDENT INDIVIDUAL 
BASIS UPON WHICH TO PURSUE THIS 
CLAIM 
A. Hatton has Adequately Stated His Individual Claim in 
the 1993 Complaint and Subsequent Proceedings 
The defendants argue that Hatton cannot pursue an individual 
claim because he is not a party to the Promissory Note, nor is he 
entitled to payment under the provisions of the Purchase Agreement. 
The documents in this case, however, establish other; ise. 
It is undisputed that William Hatton was specifically 
designated a separate party to the Purchase Agreement. (R. 119, 
133). William Hatton signed the Purchase Agreement as a separate 
party to that document. (R. 119, 133). The Promissory Note was 
specifically incorporated as part of the Purchase Agreement to 
which William Hatton was a party. (R. 137). Although the 
defendants try to argue that only the form of the Promissory Note 
was incorporated as part of the agreement, it is clear that the 
Promissory Note itself was an integral part of the Purchase 
Agreement, to the extent that the installment terms of the 
Promissory Note were specifically included in paragraph 2(c) of the 
Purchase Agreement. (R. 178-179) 
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Being faced with the undisputed fact that William Hatton is a 
separate individual party to the Purchase Agreement, the defendants 
try to adopt the unique argument that there are certain paragraphs 
of the Purchase Agreement to which William Hatton is not a party 
and, therefore, as to those specific paragraphs, Hatton has no 
enforceable right. Understandably, the defendants cite no 
authority for that position. Indeed, that argument is directly 
contrary to paragraph 19(b) of the Purchase Agreement which 
provides as follows: 
All of the terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon 
and inure to the benefit of and shall be enforceable, by 
the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, legal 
representatives and assigns of buyer, seller, and the 
Hattons. (Emphasis Added) (R. 203). 
Clearly, an heir, assign, or successor can enforce only those 
rights held by the original contracting party. If Hatton had no 
individual right to enforce "all of the terms of the Agreement", or 
if all of his rights were solely derivative through the Travel 
Company, identifying Hatton individually in that paragraph would be 
meaningless. All provisions of a contract are deemed to be 
included for a reason and any construction of an agreement which 
renders any part of it meaningless should be avoided. Oregon Bank 
v. Nautilus Crane and Eguipment Corp., 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95 
(1984). A contract is to be strictly construed against its 
drafter. Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P. 2d 1105 (Utah 1982). Except 
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for minor alterations, the Purchase Agreement was drafted by 
lawyers for Morris Travel. (R. 143-144). 
The defendants argue that the allegations in the Complaint 
make it clear that Hatton has no individual claim. They base this 
on the language of the Complaint which repeatedly lists the name 
The Travel Company and not William Hatton in the specific 
allegations. In this notice pleading state, such a claim is 
unfounded. 
There is no dispute that The Travel Company and William Hatton 
are both listed as separate identifiable plaintiffs in the 
Complaint. In paragraph 3 of the Complaint it is clearly 
designated that this action is being brought by William Hatton, as 
president of The Travel Company and individually. (R. 2). At the 
end of each cause of action and in the final prayer for relief in 
the complaint, it is the plaintiffs, not the Travel Company alone, 
which pray for judgment against the defendants. (R. 2-56). 
In a notice pleading state such as Utah (and Arizona), the 
purpose of pleadings is to give notice of opposing claims. Arizona 
Property & Casualty Insurance Guarantee Fund v. Helme, 153 Ariz. 
123, 735 P.2d 445 (1986). The Utah Supreme Court has set out the 
notice pleading standard as follows: 
The purpose of pleadings is to advise the opponent and 
give him an opportunity to meet the issues and the 
contentions. If that purpose is served, the requirements 
of the law are met. 
Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975). 
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That standard has been satisfied in this case. Pleadings need 
only serve notice of the claim asserted and need not express a 
complete recitation of all facts which support a claim for relief. 
Eliminator, Inc. v. 4700 Holly Corp., 681 P.2d 536 (Colo. App. 
1984). It is clear from the face of the pleadings that William 
Hatton is asserting an individual right to proceeds under the 
Purchase Agreement. That allegation alone put the defendants on 
notice of Hattonfs individual claim and lead to further 
proceedings, including the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
Had the defendants felt that the was complaint insufficiently pled 
to a point that they could not reasonably frame a responsive 
pleading, they had the option of moving for a more definite 
statement under Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The defendants did not file such a motion and this case moved 
forward with the filing of memoranda on the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. 
It is clear from the above argument that, under Utah's notice 
pleading requirements, the plaintiff has sufficiently raised his 
individual claim in this case. Even if it were deemed that the 
pleadings did not sufficiently raise Hatton's individual claim, 
that issue has been preserved pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part as 
follows: 
15 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the underlying purpose 
of this Rule 15(b) is that judgment should be granted in accordance 
with law and evidence as the ends of justice require, whether the 
pleadings are actually amended or not. First Security Bank v. 
Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859 (Utah 1979). Where a defendant 
has ample opportunity to present contrary evidence and does not 
object to the plaintiff's evidence on the ground that it was not 
within the issues of the case, the defendant cannot complain of a 
record conforming to that evidence. Draper v. J.B.& R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 P.2d 260 (1952). 
The parties fully briefed and argued the issues regarding 
William Hatton's individual right to pursue these claims. Those 
substantive legal issues included the issues on appeal: the fact 
that Hatton was in direct contractual privity with the defendants, 
Hatton's ability to pursue the individual claim as a stockholder in 
whom the assets of the dissolved corporation had vested, and 
Hatton's ability to pursue the individual claim as a third-party 
beneficiary of the agreement between Morris Travel and the Travel 
Company. These issues were fully briefed and argued by the parties 
in the trial court. As such, under Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the evidence in this case incorporates all of 
those substantive arguments. 
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The appellants will not restate their argument regarding 
William Hatton's individual claims as a third-party creditor 
beneficiary of the Promissory Note between Morris Travel and the 
Travel Company. The intent to confer a benefit on William and 
Wanda Hatton was clear from the negotiating position of the 
parties. The Hattons were the sole shareholders and only 
individuals to receive payment under the terms of the Note. Just 
as a corporation can only act through its employees, benefits 
received by a corporation, in this case the payments received by 
the Travel Company under the Promissory Note, can only be received 
by shareholders of the corporation. The defendants' argument that 
nothing in the Purchase Agreement or Promissory Note demonstrates 
an intent to confer any benefit on William Hatton ignores the 
reality of the contracting situation. 
B. The Hatton divorce documents and the 1988 complaint 
do not preclude the assertion of Hatton's individual 
claim. 
To undermine Hatton's ability to pursue an individual claim, 
the defendants argue that the Hatton divorce documents, as well as 
the previously-filed 1988 complaint confirm that these are Travel 
Company claims only. It is true that much of the language in the 
divorce documentation and the language of the 1988 complaint talk 
of "The Travel Company". That, in itself, doesn't mean that 
William Hatton does not have an individual right to pursue those 
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claims. Simply because rights to pursue a claim exist in one party 
does not preclude the same rights in other parties. That situation 
happens all the time in the law. For example, a driver and 
passenger in a car may be rear-ended by a negligent defendant. The 
driver may file a complaint against the defendant without the 
passenger being a party to that action. The driver/plaintiff may, 
for whatever reason, dismiss without prejudice the first-filed 
complaint. The driver and passenger may then refile the complaint 
as co-plaintiffs against the defendant. In that case, the 
defendant would not be able to argue in the second action that, 
simply because the passenger was not a party to the first action, 
the passenger did not have a legitimate negligence claim. In 
essence, that's what the defendants in this case are saying. Just 
because Hatton's individual claim was not specifically included in 
those previous proceedings does not mean that his claim does not 
exist or cannot be asserted. Whether that claim exists is based on 
the substantive law to be addressed on this appeal. The 
defendants' focus on these procedural issues provides little 
assistance and detracts from the substantive legal issues to be 
decided. 
POINT V 
(Replying to Appellees' Point VI) 
HATTON IS ENTITLED TO PURSUE THIS 
CLAIM AS A SUCCESSOR SHAREHOLDER OF 
THE TRAVEL COMPANY ASSETS. 
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REGARDLESS, HATTON CAN PURSUE THIS 
INDIVIDUAL CLAIM BECAUSE HE IS IN 
DIRECT CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY WITH THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
The plaintiff will not restate its argument in Point IV. B. of 
its initial Brief regarding Hatton's ability to pursue this case as 
a successor shareholder of the Travel Company. The plaintiffs 
believe that the cases cited in that section of their initial Brief 
support Hatton pursuing this claim as a successor shareholder, even 
after the two-year corporate dissolution statute expired. Levy v. 
Lieblinq, 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956). Hatton does, however, want 
to restate his position, conspicuously not addressed by the 
defendants in their Brief, that a shareholder can sue for breach of 
contract on any contract to which he is a party. This is an 
exception to the general rule that a shareholder has no individual 
cause of action for injuries sustained by the corporation. This 
was clarified by the Alaska Supreme Court in Hikita v. Nichiro 
Gvoqyo Kiasha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1986): 
We hold that a shareholder can sue for breach of contract 
to which he is a party, even if he has not suffered an 
injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other 
shareholders. . . . 
Id. at 1200. 
CONCLUSION 
The applicable statute of limitations in this case is the six-
year limitation of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2), not the two-year 
corporate dissolution statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100. For 
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policy purposes, there is no distinction between a statute of 
limitations and a survival statute. Further, that two-year 
limitation only applies to predissolution causes of action, not the 
plaintiffs' postdissolution causes of action here. Even if the 
two-year limitation period applies, that limitation period should 
be extended under the facts of this case to allow winding up 
activity and for equitable reasons. 
Regardless of this Court's conclusions regarding the claims of 
the Travel Company, William Hatton is entitled to pursue his 
individual claims against the defendants. Hatton is a named party 
to the Purchase Agreement and in direct contractual privity with 
the defendants. Hatton is also allowed to pursue this individual 
claim because the assets of the Travel Company passed to him on 
dissolution. Finally, Hatton is a clear third party creditor 
beneficiary of the Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note. 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in granting the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The trial court's 
conclusions and order and judgment should be reversed and this case 
should be remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits. 
Dated this ^c/\ day of June, 1994. 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C. 
GORDON K. JENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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ADDENDUM 
78-12-44. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise 
to pay. 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest 
shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or 
claim, or any promise I o pay the same, shall have been made, an action may 
be brought within tho period prescribed for the same after such payment, 
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in 
writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby. When a right of action is 
barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a 
cause of action or ground of defense. 
